と題した講演(原題は「The Spectre of Monetarism」)をマーク・カーニーBOE総裁が、今月5日にリバプールジョンムーア大学のロスコー講演*1行っているクルーグマン経由のスキデルスキー経由)。


Real incomes falling for a decade.
The legacy of a searing financial crisis weighing on confidence and growth.
The very nature of work disrupted by a technological revolution.
This was the middle of the 19th century.
Liverpool was in the midst of a golden age; its Custom House was the national Exchequer’s biggest source of revenue.
And Karl Marx was scribbling in the British Library, warning of a spectre haunting Europe, the spectre of communism.
We meet today during the first lost decade since the 1860s.
In the wake of a global financial crisis.
And in the midst of a technological revolution that is once again changing the nature of work.
Substitute Northern Rock for Overend Gurney; Uber and machine learning for the Spinning Jenny and the steam engine; and Twitter for the telegraph; and you have dynamics that echo those of 150 years ago.
Then the villains were the capitalists. Should they today be the central bankers? Are their flights of fancy promoting stagnation and inequality? Does the spectre of monetarism haunt our economies?
These are serious charges, based on real anxieties. They merit sober, objective assessment.
This evening I want to discuss the role of monetary policy in this time of great disruption. But first I will focus on the underlying causes and consequences of weak real income growth and inequality across the advanced world.
当時の悪役は資本主義者だった。今日では中央銀行家ということになるのだろうか? 彼らが想像を逞しくしていることが停滞と格差を促進しているのだろうか? マネタリズムという亡霊が我々の経済を徘徊しているのだろうか?


  1. 貿易と技術からの利得が不公平であるという現実を含め、我々が直面している問題を経済学者が明確に認めること
  2. 金融政策、財政政策、構造改革の組み合わせをリバランスして経済を成長させること
  3. 誰もがグローバリゼーションと関わりを持つような、より包括的な成長に移行すること


The 2008 financial crisis threatened depression and mass unemployment, with the least well-off most exposed.
Fiscal policy quickly came under severe strain as tax revenues plunged, the costs of social benefits rose sharply, and the huge bills for too-big-to-fail banks came due. Since then sustained austerity has reduced the fiscal deficit from around 10% of GDP in 2010 to around 3 ½ % today. While necessary, this has, on average, subtracted around 1 percentage point from demand each year. Over that time, structural policies have boosted participation in the labour market but have been unable to return productivity growth to anything resembling its historic average.
For seven years, in the face of severe headwinds to growth, monetary policy has been the only game in town.
Its task has been complicated by those historically low equilibrium interest rates. These likely turned negative in the aftermath of the crisis, meaning that monetary policy has had to run very fast just to stand still. Given constraints on how low nominal interest rates could go, the Bank of England’s MPC had to buy gilts – so-called Quantitative Easing (QE).
What if the MPC had not acted? Simulations using the Bank’s main forecasting model suggest that the Bank’s monetary policy measures raised the level of GDP by around 8% relative to trend and lowered unemployment by 4 percentage points at their peak. Without this action, real wages would have been 8% lower, or around £2,000 per worker per year, and 1.5 million more people would have been out of work. In short, monetary policy has been highly effective.
So monetary policy has been highly effective in doing its job, but what have been the distributional effects on financial outcomes? Has monetary policy robbed savers to pay borrowers? Has the MPC been Robin Hood in reverse? In a word, no.
That’s in part because, to a large extent, the thrifty saver and the rich asset holder are often one and the same....
...the macro-financial record of the “only game in town” is clear. It is not just that mass unemployment and debt deflation have been avoided. Since rates were cut to their (then) lowest possible levels and QE was launched, 2 ½ million jobs have been created, the proportion of people in work has moved to its highest level on record, nominal wages are up 17%, real GDP is up 15%, and the UK has consistently been one of the strongest economies in the G7. All major income groups have seen their income and wealth rise.
Monetary policy has offset all of the headwinds to growth arising from private deleveraging, fiscal consolidation and subdued world growth (Chart 16). People haven’t been made poorer; rather across major income and wealth categories, they are better off, and at the margin, surprisingly, income inequality has fallen a bit.1
金融政策委員会が動かなかったらどうなっていたであろうか? BOEの主要予測モデルを用いたシミュレーションが示すところによると、BOEの採った金融政策は、GDP水準をトレンドに比べて約8%押し上げ、失業率の頂点を4%ポイント引き下げた。その政策が無ければ、実質賃金は8%、労働者一人当たり年にして約2000ポンド低くなっていただろう。また失業者は150万人増えていただろう。つまるところ、金融政策は極めて効果的だった。
金融政策の仕事が極めて効果的に遂行されたとしても、金融面の帰結における分配効果はどうだったか? 金融政策は貯蓄者から奪ったものを債務者に支払っていたのか? 金融政策委員会は逆ロビンフッドだったのか? 一言でいえば、否、である。

*1:cf. 講演名の由来

*2:[原注]To be clear, these improvements in financial distributions were not explicit objectives but; but welcome outcomes.(正確には、金融面での分配の改善は明示的な目標とはされていなかったが、歓迎すべき帰結だった。)