Gorodnichenkoの共著論文をもう一丁。以下はYuriy Gorodnichenko(UCバークレー)、Oleksandr Talavera(バーミンガム大)、Nam Hoai Vu(同)によるNBER論文「Quality and Price Setting of High-Tech Goods」(ungated版)の要旨。

This paper investigates the link between product quality and price setting for central processing units (CPUs). Using thousands of price quotes from a popular price-comparison website, we find that market fundamentals, such as the number of sellers, median price, share of convenient prices and level of seller stability, are important factors for explaining price stickiness and price dispersion. We demonstrate that calculations of price inflation require conditioning not only on CPU quality, but also on market fundamentals to ensure that CPU attributes are priced correctly. Failing to do so can result in an understatement of CPU price deflation in the sample period.


Quality improvement has long been a major challenge for measuring inflation, especially for goods with rapid technological advancements. Hedonic regression is a popular approach for ensuring the correct prices for upgrades of product attribute trends (see e.g., Gordon and Griliches, 1997; Shiratsuka, 1999; Bils, 2009). However, this approach ignores the fact that prices are also affected by other factors, such as market and product characteristics.
We follow the common approach in the existing literature (see e.g., Byrne et al., 2018; Aizcorbe et al., 2020) and run the hedonic regression for each pair of consecutive years in our sample. More specifically, we include product characteristics and market fundamentals as control variables. Our focus is on the quality-adjusted price movement which is reflected by the coefficient of the year dummy for each time period. We show that hedonic adjustment may be incomplete if pricing of product attributes varies across products. Thus, one should control, not only for product attributes, but also for market fundamentals.
品質の向上はインフレを測定する上で長年の間大きな課題になっており、技術進歩が急速な商品については特にそうである。ヘドニック回帰は製品の特性トレンドのアップグレードについて正しい価格を保証する上で人気のある手法である(例えばGordon and Griliches, 1997; Shiratsuka, 1999; Bils, 2009を参照)。しかし、この方法は、市場と製品の属性のような他の要因にも価格が左右されることを無視している。
我々は既存の研究の一般的な手法(例えばByrne et al., 2018; Aizcorbe et al., 2020を参照)を踏襲し、我々のサンプル期間の連続した年の各ペアについてヘドニック回帰を行った。より具体的に言うならば、製品の属性と市場ファンダメンタルズをコントロール変数として含めた。我々は、各期間の年ダミーの係数に反映される品質調整済みの価格変動に焦点を当てた。我々は、製品属性の値付けが製品間でばらついている場合、ヘドニック調整が不完全であろうことを示す。従って、製品の属性だけでなく市場ファンダメンタルズもコントロールする必要がある。

*1:ungated版の本文では「convenient prices (also called price points such $9.99 or $99)」と書かれており、price pointはwikipediaで「Price points are prices at which demand for a given product is supposed to stay relatively high.」と説明されている。


Olivier Coibion(テキサス大オースティン校)、Yuriy Gorodnichenko(UCバークレー)、Michael Weber(シカゴ大)のNBER論文をもう一丁。以下は昨年の大統領選投票日前に出された表題のNBER論文(原題は「Political Polarization and Expected Economic Outcomes」、ungated版VoxEU記事)の要旨。

We use a large-scale representative survey of households from October 19-21 that elicits respondents’ expectations about the presidential election’s outcome as well as their economic expectations to document several new facts. First, people disagree strongly about the likely outcome of the election, despite widespread publicly available polling information. Most Democrats are very confident in a Biden win while most Republicans are very confident in a Trump win. Second, respondents predict a fairly rosy economic scenario if their preferred candidate wins but a dire one if the other candidate wins. Since most respondents are confident in their favored outcome, unconditional forecasts are similar across parties despite the fact that underlying probability distributions and conditional forecasts are very different. Third, when presented with recent polling data, most voters change their views by little unless they are independent and/or have relatively weak priors about the outcome. Information that emphasizes the uncertainty in polling data has larger effects in terms of reducing polarization in expected probabilities over different electoral outcomes. Fourth, exogenous information that changes individuals’ probability distribution over electoral outcomes also changes their unconditional forecasts in a corresponding manner. These changes in economic expectations in turn are likely to affect household economic decisions.


という主旨のNBER論文「Fiscal Policy and Households’ Inflation Expectations: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial」をOlivier Coibion(テキサス大オースティン校)、Yuriy Gorodnichenko(UCバークレー)、Michael Weber(シカゴ大)のトリオが上げている(ungated版)。以下はその要旨。

Rising government debt levels around the world are raising the specter that authorities might seek to inflate away the debt. In theoretical settings where fiscal policy “dominates” monetary policy, higher debt without offsetting changes in primary surpluses should lead households to anticipate this higher inflation. Are household inflation expectations sensitive to fiscal considerations in practice? We field a large randomized control trial on U.S. households to address this question by providing randomly chosen subsets of households with information treatments about the fiscal outlook and then observing how they revise their expectations about future inflation as well as taxes and government spending. We find that information about the current debt or deficit levels has little impact on inflation expectations but that news about future debt leads them to anticipate higher inflation, both in the short run and long run. News about rising debt also induces households to anticipate rising spending and a higher rate of interest for government debt.
世界中で上昇しつつある政府債務水準は、当局がインフレで債務を軽減しようとするのではないかという疑念を高めている。財政政策が金融政策を「支配する」理論的枠組みでは、債務が増加して基礎的財政黒字の変化がそれを相殺しない場合は、家計は必然的にそうした高インフレ予想を抱くようになる。現実でも家計のインフレ予想は財政懸念に敏感に反応するだろうか? この問題に取り組むために我々は、米家計に対して大規模なランダム化比較試験を実施した。同試験ではランダムに選んだ家計の部分集合に財政見通しの情報を与え、彼らが将来のインフレや、税と政府支出の予想をどのように改訂するかを観測した。現在の債務や財政赤字の水準に関する情報はインフレ予想にほとんど影響しないが、将来の債務に関するニュースは短期と長期の両方においてインフレ予想を高めることを我々は見い出した。債務が上昇していることに関するニュースも、歳出の上昇と、政府債務に掛かる金利の上昇を家計に予想させた。


何かイベントがあるとそのCOVID-19感染への影響をNBER論文に上げている研究者のグループ*1が、今度は1/6の議事堂占拠事件を取り上げた。以下はDhaval M. Dave(ベントレー大)、Drew McNichols(UCサンディエゴ)、Joseph J. Sabia(サンディエゴ州立大)による表題のNBER論文(原題は「Political Violence, Risk Aversion, and Non-Localized Disease Spread: Evidence from the U.S. Capitol Riot」)の要旨。

On January 6, 2021, the U.S. Capitol was sieged by rioters protesting certification of Joseph R. Biden’s election as the 46th president of the United States. The Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quickly predicted that the Riot would be a COVID-19 “surge event.” This study is the first to estimate the impact of the Capitol Riot on risk-averting behavior and community-level spread of the novel coronavirus. First, using anonymized smartphone data from SafeGraph, Inc. and an event-study approach, we document that on January 6th there was a substantial increase in non-resident smartphone pings in the census block groups including the Ellipse, the National Mall, and the U.S. Capitol Building, consistent with a large protest that day. Next, using data from the same source and a synthetic control approach, we find that the Capitol Riot increased stay-at-home behavior among District of Columbia residents, indicative of risk averting behaviors in response to violence and health risks. Finally, turning to COVID-19 case data, we find no evidence that the Capitol Riot substantially increased community spread of COVID-19 in the District of Columbia in the month-long period following the event. This may be due to increases in social distancing and a “virtual lockdown” of the Capitol prior to the inauguration of the new president. However, exploiting variation in non-resident smartphone inflows into the January 6 Capitol protest, we find that counties with the highest protester inflows experienced a significant increase in the rate of daily cumulative COVID-19 case growth in the month following the protest. We conclude that the Capitol Riot may have contributed to non-localized COVID-19 spread.


タイラー・コーエンが要旨を紹介し、ノアピニオン氏が批判的に取り上げている邦訳)David Neumark(UCアーバイン)とPeter Shirley(ウエスバージニア州議会)の論文「Myth or Measurement: What Does the New Minimum Wage Research Say about Minimum Wages and Job Loss in the United States?」を、ケイトー研究所のRyan Bourneが表題の記事(原題は「The Distorted Minimum Wage Debate」)でクルーグマン叩きに援用している

It sometimes feels as if advocates and opponents of minimum wage hikes are talking in different universes. In large part, that stems from completely opposite interpretations of the balance of the academic literature on the subject.
Research on the minimum wage in the U.S. has been extensive, yet one can read Paul Krugman claiming “There’s just no evidence that raising the minimum wage costs jobs, at least when the starting point is as low as it is in modern America,” right through to other academics concluding “There is considerable support for the competitive market hypothesis that an effective minimum wage would result in lower employment.”
Which view better reflects our understanding? In a new working paper, economists David Neumark and Peter Shirley assemble the entire set of published papers that examine the impact of minimum wage hikes on employment outcomes at the state and local level in the U.S. since 1992. Contacting the researchers who wrote the papers, they identify those researchers’ “core” or preferred results in each case whenever possible, using the gathered estimates to summarize the last three decades of research.
Their conclusions, contrary to what you might read in the rest of the media, are clear:

  • The overwhelming majority of papers analyzing the U.S. estimate a negative effect on employment of minimum wage hikes (79.3 percent of them). In fact more than half of all papers have a negative impact that is statistically significant at the 10% level or more.
  • The negative impact is stronger for teens, young adults, and less‐​educated workers, and especially strong for directly affected workers (those who see their wage rate increase automatically through the policy.)
  • There is no evidence of these impacts becoming less negative in studies from more recent years.
  • Studies that look at the impact of minimum wage hikes on low‐​wage industries (rather than population groups) are less likely to find a negative impact on employment. But these are less good at identifying the impact of a wage floor hike on low‐​wage workers as a group, because the proportion of workers directly affected is obviously smaller, and the employment results may reflect employers substituting low‐​skilled labor for higher‐​skilled labor.

Neumark and Shirley summarize their findings by saying: “our evidence indicates that concluding that the body of research evidence fails to find disemployment effects of minimum wages requires discarding or ignoring most of the evidence.”
Next time someone says “there’s no evidence the minimum wage costs jobs or hours,” point them in the direction of this paper...
どちらの見解が我々の理解をより良く反映しているのだろうか? 経済学者のDavid NeumarkとPeter Shirley は、新たなワーキングペーパーで、1992年以降の州・地方レベルの最低賃金引上げの雇用への影響について調べた公表論文すべてを集計した。彼らは論文の著者に連絡を取り、各研究者の「中心的」ないし選好する結果を可能な限り特定し、収集した推計値を用いて過去30年の研究を要約した。

  • 米国を分析した論文の圧倒的多数(79.3%)が最低賃金引上げの雇用への負の効果を推計している。実際のところ、すべての論文の半分以上が10%水準もしくはそれ以上の水準で統計的に有意な負の効果を示している。
  • 負の効果は10代、ヤングアダルト、および教育程度の低い労働者で強く、直接影響を受ける労働者(賃金率がその政策によって自動的に増加する人々)で特に強い。
  • 直近の研究ほどその負の影響が弱まるという実証結果は得られなかった。
  • (人々のグループではなく)低賃金業種への最低賃金引上げの影響を調べた研究では、雇用への負の影響を見出す傾向は弱まった。しかし、そうした研究はグループとしての低賃金労働者への最低賃金引上げの影響をあまりうまく特定できなかった。というのは、直接影響を受ける労働者の割合は明らかに小さく、また雇用効果は雇用者が低技能労働者で高技能労働者を置き換えることを反映している可能性があるからである。




Raising the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour by 2025 would increase wages for at least 17 million people, but also put 1.4 million Americans out of work, according to a study by the Congressional Budget Office released on Monday.
A phase-in of a $15 minimum wage would also lift some 900,000 out of poverty, according to the nonpartisan CBO. This higher federal minimum could raise wages for an additional 10 million workers who would otherwise make sightly above that wage rate, the study found.
Potential job losses were estimated to affect 0.9 percent of workers, the CBO wrote, adding: "Young, less educated people would account for a disproportionate share of those reductions in employment."


CBO also estimated the number of affected workers who would experience those changes in pay. If the Raise the Wage Act of 2021 is not enacted, 17 million workers (or 10 percent of the labor force as it is projected under current law) will have wages below the minimums proposed by the bill, CBO estimates, during an average week in 2025. That is therefore the number of workers who would be directly affected by the bill. Also, 10 million workers during that average week will have wages that are only slightly higher than the proposed minimums; that is the number who would be potentially affected. If the bill was enacted and the minimum wage rose, wages for many of those workers would increase as employers sought to retain some of the differences in pay that had previously existed among those workers.




So is the Biden plan too big? We need to be clear about what it's for. IT'S NOT STIMULUS. This isn't at all like the ARRA, which was all about boosting demand; this is disaster relief. Or maybe it will help if we think of it as being like fighting a war against Covid fallout 1/
When you're budgeting for a war, you don't decide how much to spend by estimating what it would take to fill the output gap; you estimate what it would take to win the war. 2/
Is everything in the Biden plan well-targeted on our needs? No. But the controversial part, checks to most of the population, is just a fraction of the plan 3/
Mostly the plan is about directly fighting the pandemic, reopening schools, avoiding cuts in vital services, and helping families in dire need. Ideally we might achieve these goals at somewhat less cost, but speed and simplicity are more important than perfection 4/
Now, wartime spending isn't about stimulus, but is nonetheless stimulative, and overheating can be a real concern. But the Fed can contain inflation; and in any case the less-essential parts of the plan probably have low multipliers 5/
In particular, most of those "stimulus checks" will probably be saved, and aside from the fact that state/local aid is largely a way to head off fiscal contraction, any excess will probably be banked. 6/
So if you're worried about overheating, you shouldn't focus on the notion that the plan is too big; your real concern is that, like fighting a war, doing what needs to be done may be inflationary. And the answer in that case is not to do less, but to limit the inflation 7/
We'll see if we really do overheat. But the idea that this is a gratuitously large plan confuses the goals of the policy with the macroeconomics of getting it done 8/
ということで、バイデンプランは巨額過ぎるのだろうか? その目的についてはっきりさせておくべきだろう。これは刺激策ではない。これは、需要を支えることが至上課題だったARRAのようなものではまったくない。これは災害救助なのだ。あるいは、Covidがもたらす被害に対する戦争を遂行するようなもの、と考えると良いだろう。
バイデンプランにおいてはすべてが我々の需要に上手く応えているだろうか? 否、である。しかし論争の的となっている国民の大多数への小切手は、プランのごく一部に過ぎない。



My long form defense of going big on pandemic rescue. IT'S NOT ABOUT STIMULUS. It's like fighting a war (on pandemic fallout.) And you spend what you need to win a war, not just enough to close the output gap 1/
Fear of inflation are greatly exaggerated: the economy can probably run hotter than CBO thinks, the multipliers on a lot of the spending probably aren't that high, and the Fed is well able to contain inflation if it becomes a problem 2/
And the idea that we need to save fiscal ammunition for future programs is completely backwards. Remember 2009! The constraint is political, not financial; what we need is a program that delivers tangible benefits to voters, showing them that govt can do good. 3/
So go big. The risks of undershooting are too severe to do anything else 4/
それと、将来のプランのために財政の弾薬を取っておく必要があるというのは完全に後ろ向きである。2009年を思い出そう! 制約は政治的なものであって財政的なものではない。必要なのは、政府も良いことができる、ということを示す、有権者に目に見える恩恵を与えるプランなのだ。