というNBER論文をMostly Economicsが紹介しているJournal of Development Economicsのオープンアクセス版)。原題は「Top Talent, Elite Colleges, and Migration: Evidence from the Indian Institutes of Technology」で、著者はPrithwiraj Choudhury(ハーバード大)、Ina Ganguli(マサチューセッツ大学アマースト校)、Patrick Gaulé(ブリストル大)。Mostly EconomicsによるとIITや海外移住界隈のSNSでバズっているとの由。

We study migration in the right tail of the talent distribution using a novel dataset of Indian high school students taking the Joint Entrance Exam (JEE), a college entrance exam used for admission to the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). We find a high incidence of migration after students complete college: among the top 1,000 scorers on the exam, 36% have migrated abroad, rising to 62% for the top 100 scorers. We next document that students who attended the original “Top 5” Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) were 5 percentage points more likely to migrate for graduate school compared to equally talented students who studied in other institutions. We explore two mechanisms for these patterns: signaling, for which we study migration after one university suddenly gained the IIT designation; and alumni networks, using information on the location of IIT alumni in U.S. computer science departments.

*1:IITは23校あるが(cf. インド工科大学 - Wikipedia)、論文では当初設立されたカラグプル校、ボンベイ校、カーンプル校、マドラス校、デリー校をトップ5としている。

*2:2012年にIITバラナシ校となったバナラス・ヒンドゥー大学(Banaras Hindu University - Wikipedia)について調べた結果、海外の大学院進学の確率が5割増しになった(10.5%だったのが5.4%ポイント上昇)というシグナリング効果が認められたが、その大きさはトップ5効果ほどではなかったとの由。



というNBER論文をブルナーメイヤーらが上げている(H/T Mostly Economicsungated(SSRM)版)。原題は「The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German Hyperinflation」で、著者はMarkus K. Brunnermeier(プリンストン大)、Sergio A. Correia(FRB)、Stephan Luck(NY連銀)、Emil Verner(MIT)、Tom Zimmermann(ケルン大)。

This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919-1923, we show that inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible.

ungated版の冒頭では以下の書からの「The Germany of the inflation was paradise for anyone who owed money.(インフレ期のドイツはお金の借り手にとってはパラダイスだった)」という言葉が引用されている。



EF: Shifting topics a little bit, in your 2019 article "Democracy Does Cause Growth," you and your co-authors found that democratic institutions are associated with economic growth. Why is that? What are the mechanisms behind this?
Acemoglu: I'm proud of that paper because, for some reason, there was an emerging consensus within political science and economics that democracy was not a good system for dealing with economic problems. I think it was fueled in part by China — people seeing China's tremendous leap and saying look how well autocracy works, and at the same time also witnessing gridlock and economic problems in various democracies.
We were very suspicious of this, which is the reason we started this project. As soon as we started, we realized if you organize the data in the most neutral way, it is amazingly apparent that democracies actually grow quite a bit faster. And one way of doing that is just to look at the same country before and after becoming democratized. Before, when they are under a dictatorship, they have a lot of economic problems. And then after democracy, it takes a while for stability to set in, but after a while a rapid growth experience exists.
Why is that? Well, one of the things that democracies do is they increase taxes; democracies raise more revenue and spend more money.
And where do they spend it? Well, some would say waste, of course; it's the nature of bureaucracy. But a lot of it goes to health, education, and public infrastructure. That's part of the answer. But also contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that democracies are better at doing reform. They are much better than dictatorships at dealing with monopolies. They are better than dictatorships at increasing the capabilities of the workers, especially low-income people in the community. So there are a number of dimensions to the link behind democracy and growth.

話題を少し変えますが、2019年の論文「民主主義は実際に経済成長を促す」で貴兄と共著者は、民主制度は経済成長と関連していることを見い出しました。それはなぜでしょうか? 背後にあるメカニズムは何でしょうか?
その理由は何でしょうか? 民主主義によって達成される一つのことは、税収の引き上げです。民主主義は歳入を増やし、歳出も増やすのです。
支出先は何でしょうか? 無駄になるという指摘ももちろんあります。それは官僚制につきものです。しかし多くは医療、教育、公共インフラに振り向けられます。それが答えの一つです。また世間知に反し、民主主義国は改革の実施に優れていることを我々は見い出しました。独占企業に対処するのに、独裁制よりも優れていたのです。労働者、特に社会の低所得層の能力を高めることにも優れていました。ということで、民主主義と成長の関係には多くの側面があります。





  1. その時点の技術の性格
  2. 労働者の交渉力を形成する制度
  3. 予想とノルム(expectations and norms)

このうち、最後の予想とノルムがとりわけ重要、とアセモグルは主張する。一例としてアセモグルは、Alex He、Daniel le Maireとの共同研究*1で見い出された、ビジネススクールで教育を受けた経営者が賃金を削減する傾向を挙げている。彼らは、株主の利益を追い求め、企業をスリムにする、というビジョンないし予想ないし思想に従っている、というのがアセモグルの見方である。
大規模言語モデルなどのAIをはじめとするデジタル技術の急速な普及によって組織の技術(organizational technologies*2)が変化している今のような転換期には、予想とノルムは特に重要性を増す、とアセモグルは言う。ビジネス界は、人間よりもそうしたツールにますます依拠するべき、というビジョンで動いており、そのこともそうした変化を駆動している。そのような変化の時に際して予想とノルムが重要になるのは、技術の方向性がまだオープンだからである。労働者を削減し、脇に追いやり、彼らならではの技能を使わない方向に進むこともできるし、労働者の新たな業務と新たな機会を創造する方向に進むこともできる、とアセモグルは言う。

ここでアセモグルは、インタビュアーの指摘に応じて、David Autor、Jonathon Hazell、Pascual Restrepoとの共著論文*3の内容を紹介している。その研究によれば:

  • AI関係の雇用は2013年ないし2014年時点でもまだあまり多くなかった。2015-2016年に変曲点が生じ、それ以降、多くの産業の多くの事業所でAI関係の労働者を求めるようになった。
  • 研究では企業レベルではなく事業所レベル(バーガーキングならばバーガーキング社全体ではなく店舗レベル)の求人を調べたが、どのような事業所がAI関連の人材を求めているかというと、複雑な機能が必要な創造的な業務ではなく、AI技術で置き換えられるような単純業務を行っている事業所であった。






EF: Objecting to the effects of new technology on labor is sometimes casually linked with the Luddites. As you know, the Luddites were a group of 19th-century English textile workers who responded to automation by destroying textile machinery. Setting aside their methods, what were the Luddites right about and what were they wrong about?
Acemoglu: There's a debate about Luddites, and I think the public almost always sees one aspect of the Luddites — that of the rabble-rousers who went around creating trouble. There was that; it's not deniable. But Luddites were part of a broader nascent working-class movement that was trying to articulate ideas about worker rights, worker participation in decision-making, and how work could be organized in a way that was beneficial for workers. So the Luddites had some ugly parts and some forward-looking elements as well.
But specifically in the context of the weaving machines, which is what animated the Luddites, they were right that those weavers were the losers out of technological progress. Their high wages got destroyed. They were shifted into much worse working conditions for longer hours, for lower pay in factories, or lost their jobs.
What they did not do is that they did not articulate a coherent view about how we could harness and leverage technological change in a way that would be beneficial for workers as well. But that's probably asking too much from them.


産業革命の労働者への影響は結構悲惨だった、というのは例えば産業革命との比較は慰めにならない - himaginary’s diaryで紹介したコーエンが述べていることだが、アセモグルは近著*1でそれと対照的な成功例も挙げているという。

EF: In contrast, in your new book, you describe the adoption of electrical machines by factories in the late 19th century and early 20th century as highly beneficial economically to workers. Why did workers share in these gains?
Acemoglu: Why is it that electrical machinery was so beneficial and the textile machinery of the late 18th century wasn't? That brings me to the key concept of the framework that I developed in academic work with Pascual Restrepo: new tasks. If you want to think about workers benefiting, you have to think about what new tasks they can perform. And the key thing about electrical machinery — and the Ford factory in the early 20th century is a great exemplar of this — is that it generated a whole series of new tasks.
With the introduction of electrical machinery, production became more complex. So you needed workers to attend to the machinery and then you needed a lot of supporting occupations: maintenance, design, repair, and a whole slew of engineering tasks as well as many other white-collar occupations. So what really was beneficial both from the point of view of the workers and from the point of view of productivity wasn't the fact that those factories were substituting electrical power for some other kind of power. They were completely reorganizing work in a way that made it more complex and thus created more gainful activities for workers.
Not everything was rosy. It was hard work. Compared to today, workers were worn out. They found it very difficult to keep up with the pace. It was still much noisier than the kind of factories that we would see later.
And Henry Ford himself, especially later in his career, became zealous for anti-union activity. So it's not like saying Ford was a visionary in every dimension. But Ford exemplified a new type of industrialization, which created new tasks and thus opportunities for workers.

なせ電気機械はそれだけ利益をもたらしたのに、18世紀末の繊維機械はそうではなかったのか? それは、私がパスカル・レストレポとの共同研究*2で開発した新たな枠組みの主要な概念につながります。即ち、新たな業務です。労働者の利益について考えるならば、彼らが遂行できる新たな業務は何か、について考えねばなりません。そして電気機械の主な特徴は――20世紀初めのフォードの工場がその素晴らしい例なのですが――一連の新たな業務を生み出したことにあります。


日本人は生成AIに知性を幻視しがちだが、欧米人は道具として割り切っている、という主旨のはてな匿名ダイアリーが話題になったが、そもそもそうした幻想はAI業界の黎明期に端を発しており、その幻想が経済学的視点からのAIの規制を妨げている、という趣旨のことをダロン・アセモグルがリッチモンド連銀のEcon Focusのインタビュー(H/T Mostly Economics)で述べている。

EF: Arguments for regulating AI along economic lines seem uncommon now. More usually, one sees arguments about AI and alignment, about AI and long-term threats.
Acemoglu: Those arguments really confuse the debate. I'm not worried about artificial general intelligence coming and taking over humanity.
EF: Why do you think economic policy arguments about AI aren't more salient?
Acemoglu: There are many reasons. I think one of them is Hollywood and science fiction. I love science fiction, don't get me wrong, but it has conditioned us to think about the scenario in which the machines become humanlike and compete against humans.
But second, even more importantly — and this is, to me, a foundational mistake in the AI community, going back to Turing's work and to the [1956] Dartmouth Conference on AI — it was a mistake framing the objective as machines being intelligent, developing humanlike capabilities, doing better than humans. I think we should have framed the question from the beginning as a machine that's useful. We don't want machine intelligence in itself; we want machines that are useful to us having some high-level capabilities and functions.
Today, still, the way you get status in AI research is by achieving humanlike capabilities. On top of that prestige, the biggest sources of funding right now for engineering, computer science, and AI are companies like Google and Microsoft. Put the two effects together and you have an amazing bias.
And then the third is the economics profession. You know, economists are right: We owe today's prosperity to technology. We would not be 30 times as prosperous as our great-great grandparents who lived 250 years ago if it wasn't for the huge breakthroughs of industrialization, of communication, of improvements in pharmaceuticals, all of these things. Yet that does not imply that technological change is always good for workers or always good for society. So we really need to develop a perspective of how can we harness technology for the better. But if you subscribe to the view that technology is always and everywhere good, it's like a sin to ask questions about regulation of technology within the economics profession. And if you put that together with the ideological disposition of the AI community, I think you get the current picture.



というNBER論文が上がっているungated版)。原題は「Interbank Networks and the Interregional Transmission of Financial Crises: Evidence from the Panic of 1907」で、著者はMatthew S. Jaremski(ユタ州立大)、David C. Wheelock(セントルイス連銀)。

This paper provides quantitative evidence on interbank transmission of financial distress in the Panic of 1907 and ensuing recession. Originating in New York City, the panic led to payment suspensions and emergency currency issuance in many cities. Data on the universe of interbank connections show that i) suspension was more likely in cities whose banks had closer ties to banks at the center of the panic, ii) banks with such links were more likely to close in the panic and recession, and iii) banks responded to the panic by rearranging their correspondent relationships, with implications for network structure.
本稿は1907年恐慌における金融の混乱の銀行間の伝播とその後の景気後退について定量的な実証結果を提供する。ニューヨーク市発の恐慌は、多くの都市での支払い停止と緊急の通貨発行をもたらした。銀行間のつながりの母集団についてのデータが示すところによれば、i) 支払い停止は、恐慌の中心に位置していた銀行との関係が緊密な銀行の都市で起きやすかった、(ii) そうした関係を持つ銀行は、恐慌と景気後退において閉鎖する可能性が高かった、(iii) 銀行は送金の取引関係を見直すことで恐慌に対応し、そのことはネットワーク構造にとって含意するところがある。