というNBER論文をキドランドらが1月に上げている昨年6月時点のWP)。原題は「The Costs and Benefits of Caring: Aggregate Burdens of an Aging Population」で、著者はFinn Kydland(UCサンタバーバラ)、Nick Pretnar(カーネギーメロン大)。

Throughout the 21st century, population aging in the United States will lead to increases in the number of elderly people requiring some form of living assistance which, as some argue, is to be seen as a burden on society, straining old-age insurance systems and requiring younger agents to devote an increasing fraction of their time toward caring for infirm elders. Given this concern, it is natural to ask how aggregate GDP growth is affected by such a phenomenon. We develop an overlapping generations model where young agents face idiosyncratic risk of contracting an old-age disease, like for example Alzheimer's or dementia, which adversely affects their ability to fully enjoy consumption. Young agents care about their infirm elders and can choose to supplement elder welfare by spending time taking care of them. Through this channel, aggregate GDP growth endogenously depends on young agents' degree of altruism. We calibrate the model and show that projected population aging will lead to future reductions in output of 17% by 2056 and 39% by 2096 relative to an economy with a constant population distribution. Curing diseases like Alzheimer's and dementia can lead to a compounded output increase of 5.4% while improving welfare for all agents.


というNBER論文が3月に上がっているダラス連銀のWP)。原題は「Capital Controls as Macro-prudential Policy in a Large Open Economy」で、著者はJ. Scott Davis(ダラス連銀)、Michael B. Devereux(ブリティッシュコロンビア大)。

The use of international capital flow controls has become increasingly popular in academic and policy circles. But almost all the recent literature studies the case of a small economy, ignoring the spillover effects of capital controls to the rest of the world. This paper re-examines the case for capital controls in a large open economy, where domestic financial constraints may bind following a large negative shock. We consider both ex-ante capital controls (prudential) and ex-post controls (crisis management). In a large open economy, there is a tension between the desire to tax capital inflows to manipulate the terms-of-trade and tax capital outflows for either prudential or crisis management purposes. When capital controls are chosen non-cooperatively, we show that ex-post capital controls are unsuccessful in alleviating financial constraints in a crisis, and ex-ante capital controls are unsuccessful at reducing financial instability before the crisis. Non-cooperative capital controls leave the crisis-hit country even worse off than in an environment with unrestricted capital flows. In addition, a non-cooperative equilibrium with capital controls actually increases the likelihood of a financial crisis occurring. By contrast, capital controls can be effective under international cooperation and can significantly ease financial constraints when applied ex-post for crisis management and reduce the likelihood of a crisis when used ex-ante for prudential purposes.


2017年7月にBOE金融政策委員会(MPC)の外部委員になったSilvana Tenreyro・LSE教授*1が、5月に表題のNBER論文を上げているungated版昨年7月のvoxeu記事)。原題は「Optimal Inflation and the Identification of the Phillips Curve」で、共著者はBOEのMichael McLeay。

Several academics and practitioners have pointed out that inflation follows a seemingly exogenous statistical process, unrelated to the output gap, leading some to argue that the Phillips curve has weakened or disappeared. In this paper we explain why this seemingly exogenous process arises, or, in other words, why it is difficult to empirically identify a Phillips curve, a key building block of the policy framework used by central banks. We show why this result need not imply that the Phillips curve does not hold – on the contrary, our conceptual framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always holds. The reason is simple: if monetary policy is set with the goal of minimising welfare losses (measured as the sum of deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential), subject to a Phillips curve, a central bank will seek to increase inflation when output is below potential. This targeting rule will impart a negative correlation between inflation and the output gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve. We discuss different strategies to circumvent the identification problem and present evidence of a robust Phillips curve in US data.

かつてNick Roweフリードマンサーモスタット論を基に展開した議論*2を想起させる話だが、実際、ungated版ではRoweのブログエントリに言及している。


引き続きパススルーねた。ロバート・バローらが表題のNBER論文を1月に上げている3月時点のWP)。原題は「Taxes, Incorporation, and Productivity」で、著者はRobert J. Barro(ハーバード大)、Brian Wheaton(同)。

U.S. businesses can be C-corporations or pass-through entities in the forms of S-corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. C-corporate status conveys benefits from perpetual legal identity, limited liability, potential for public trading of shares, and ability to retain earnings. However, legal changes have enhanced pass-through alternatives, notably through the invention of the S-corporation in 1958, the advent of publicly-traded partnerships in the early 1980s, and the improved legal status of limited liability companies (LLCs) at the end of the 1980s. C-corporate form is typically subject to a tax wedge, which offsets the productivity benefits. We use a theoretical framework in which firms’ productivities under C-corporate and pass-through form are distributed as bivariate log-normal. The tax wedge determines the fraction of firms that opt for C-corporate status and also determines overall business output (productivity), the share of output generated by C-corporations, and the sensitivity of this share to the tax wedge. This framework underlies our empirical analysis of C-corporate shares of business economic activity. Long-difference regressions for 1968-2013 show that a higher tax wedge reduces the C-corporate share of net capital stocks, equity (book value), gross assets, and positive net income, as well as the corporate share of gross investment. The C-corporate shares also exhibit downward trends, likely reflecting underlying legal changes. We infer from the quantitative findings that the reduction in the tax wedge since 1968 has expanded overall business productivity by about 4%.



ここで紹介したように、かつてブログでピケティ=サエズ論文について書いたことのあるOwen Zidarが、ピケティ本をもじったような表題の共著NBER論文を1月に上げている直近のungated版)。原題は「Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century」で、著者はMatthew Smith(財務省)、Danny Yagan(UCバークレー)、Owen Zidar(プリンストン大)、Eric Zwick(シカゴ大)*1

How important is human capital at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners, this paper finds that entrepreneurs are key for understanding top income inequality. Most top income is non-wage income, a primary source of which is private "pass-through" business profit. These profits—which can include labor income disguised for tax reasons—accrue to working-age owners of closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Pass-through business profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of pass-through profit as human capital income, we find that the typical top earner derives most of his or her income from human capital, not financial capital. Our approach also raises the overall top 1% labor share in 2014 from 45% to 56%. Growth in pass-through profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.
人的資本は米国の所得分布の上位層でどれだけ重要だろうか? 1100万の企業とそのオーナーを結び付けた税データを用いて、本稿は、起業家が所得上位層の格差を理解する上でカギとなることを見い出した。上位層の所得の大部分は賃金以外の所得であり、その主な源泉は個人の「パススルー」事業利益である*2。こうした利益は、税制上の理由で偽装した労働所得が含まれ得るが、技能集約度の高い産業における中間市場を対象とした非公開企業の働き盛りのオーナーに帰属する。オーナーの退職後、もしくは早死にの後に、パススルー事業利益は4分の3低下する。パススルー利益の4分の3を人的資本所得と分類した結果、典型的な所得上位者は、その所得の大部分を金融資本ではなく人的資本から得ていることを我々は見い出した。我々の手法はまた、2014年における上位1%の労働所得の比率を45%から56%に上昇させた。パススルー所得の伸びは、生産性の上昇と、オーナーに帰属する付加価値の比率が上昇したことの双方で説明される。



*2:cf. ここここで紹介したマンキューのブログエントリ、および、トランプ減税におけるパススルーの扱いについてのサマーズクルーグマンの批判。


インフレねたをもう一丁。ローレンス・ボールらが1月に表題のNBER論文を上げている昨年10月25-26日のチリ中央銀行の年次コンファレンスでのWPおよびスライド資料)。原題は「The Nonpuzzling Behavior of Median Inflation」で、著者はLaurence M. Ball(ジョンズ・ホプキンス大)、Sandeep Mazumder(ウェイクフォレスト大)。

Economists are puzzled by the behavior of U.S. inflation since the Great Recession of 2008-2009, and many suggest that the Phillips curve relating inflation to unemployment has broken down. This paper argues that inflation behavior is easier to understand if we divide headline inflation into core and transitory components, and if core inflation is measured by the weighted median of industry inflation rates. This weighted median is less volatile than the traditional measure of core inflation, the inflation rate excluding food and energy prices, because it filters out large price changes in all industries. We illustrate the usefulness of the weighted median with a case study of inflation in 2017 and early 2018. We also show that a Phillips curve relating the weighted median to unemployment appears clearly in the data for 1985-2017, with no sign of a breakdown in 2008.

インフレはすぐそこまで来ているのか? フィリップス曲線と世界のインフレ圧力

以前紹介した潜在GDPに関する論文のトリオが、表題のNBER論文を1月に上げている著者の1人のサイトからungated版が読める)。原題は「Is Inflation Just Around the Corner? The Phillips Curve and Global Inflationary Pressures」で、著者はOlivier Coibion(テキサス大オースティン校)、Yuriy Gorodnichenko(UCバークレー)、Mauricio Ulate(同)。

The length of the recovery since the Great Recession and the low reported levels of the unemployment rate in the U.S. are increasingly generating concerns about inflationary pressures. We document that an expectations-augmented Phillips curve can account for inflation not just in the U.S. but across a range of countries, once household or firm-level inflation expectations are used. Given this relationship, we can infer the dynamics of slack from the dynamics of inflation gaps and vice versa. We find that the implied slack was pushing inflation below expectations in the years after the Great Recession but the global and U.S. inflation gaps have shrunk in recent years thus suggesting tighter economic conditions. While we find no evidence that inflation is on the brink of rising, the sustained deflationary pressures following the Great Recession have abated.