こちらで紹介したEcon Focus記事でリンクされている論文の紹介の最後。以下はMichael P. Dooley(UCサンタクルーズ)、David Folkerts-Landau(ドイツ銀)、Peter M. Garber(シカゴ大)による表題のNBER論文(原題は「US Sanctions Reinforce the Dollar’s Dominance」)の要旨。

Recent sanctions on the use of Russia’s international reserve assets seem likely to reduce the appeal of US dollar reserves as a “shock absorber” for international payments. But international reserves are also a means to reassure foreign investors that problematic countries will not confiscate their investments. The “collateral” motive for holding dollar reserves has been enhanced by the demonstration that the United States is willing and able to sanction misbehavior. Geopolitically risky countries now more than ever need to reassure foreign investors that their investments are safe from expropriation. We conclude that recent events will strengthen the role of the dollar as the key international reserve currency.


引き続きこちらで紹介したEcon Focus記事でリンクされている論文の紹介。以下はChristopher Clayton(イェール大)、Amanda Dos Santos(コロンビア大)、Matteo Maggiori(ハーバード大)、Jesse Schreger(コロンビア大)による表題の論文(原題は「Internationalizing Like China」)の要旨。

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by selectively opening up its domestic bond market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain China's internationalization strategy. While previously closed to foreign investors, there have recently been major increases in foreign investment in China's domestic bond market. The Chinese government deliberately controlled the entry of foreign investors into its market, first allowing in relatively stable long-term investors like central banks before allowing in flightier investors like mutual funds. Our framework explains these patterns as the result of a government strategy to build its reputation as an international currency issuer while attempting to reduce the cost of potential capital flight as it tries to gain credibility.


引き続きこちらで紹介したEcon Focus記事でリンクされている論文の紹介。以下はPierre-Olivier Gourinchas(UCバークレー)とHélène Rey(ロンドンビジネススクール)による表題の論文(原題は「Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty」、2017時点のWP*1関連エントリ)の要旨。

We provide a quarterly time series of the historical evolution of US external assets and liabilities at market value on the 1952-2016 period. The center country of the International Monetary System enjoys an "exorbitant privilege", a sizeable excess return of gross external assets over liabilities that significantly weakens its external constraint. In exchange for this "exorbitant privilege" we document that the US provides insurance to the rest of the world, especially in times of global stress. We call this the "exorbitant duty" of the hegemon. During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, wealth transfers from the US to the rest of the world amounted to about 20% of US GDP and the dollar appreciated by 8% in real terms. We present a stylized model that accounts for these facts and also links the shrinking size of the hegemon in the world economy to the decline in the world real rate of interest.

*1:この時点では著者として他に当時Direction Genérale du Tresor(フランス財務総局――cf. 経済・財務省 - Wikipedia)のNicolas Govillotが名を連ねている。また、2010年時点の初稿は日銀論文として読める(この時のGovillotの所属はEcole des Mines ――cf. パリ国立高等鉱業学校 - Wikipedia)。


前回までの3回のエントリで結論部を紹介したEcon Focus記事では、本文で幾つかの研究を紹介している。以下はそのうちの一つであるハーバード大のGita Gopinath*1とJeremy C Steinによる表題の論文WP、原題は「Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency」)の要旨。

We explore the interplay between trade-invoicing patterns and the pricing of safe assets in different currencies. Our theory highlights the following points: (i) a currency’s role as a unit of account for invoicing decisions is complementary to its role as a safe store of value; (ii) this complementarity can lead to the emergence of a single dominant currency in trade invoicing and global banking, even when multiple large candidate countries share similar economic fundamentals; (iii) firms in emerging-market countries endogenously take on currency mismatches by borrowing in the dominant currency; and (iv) the expected return on dominant-currency safe assets is lower than that on similarly safe assets denominated in other currencies, thereby bestowing an “exorbitant privilege” on the dominant currency. The theory thus provides a unified explanation for why a dominant currency is so heavily used in both trade invoicing and in global finance.

  1. インボイス決定の際の会計単位としての通貨の役割は、価値の安全な貯蔵としての役割と相補的である。
  2. この相補性は、候補となる複数の大国が似たような経済的ファンダメンタルズを有していたとしても、貿易のインボイスならびに国際銀行業務における単一の支配的な通貨の出現につながる。
  3. 新興国の企業は支配的な通貨建てで借り入れることにより、内生的に通貨のミスマッチを引き受ける。
  4. 支配的な通貨の安全資産の予想収益率は、他の通貨建ての似たような安全資産の予想収益率よりも低くなり、それによって支配的な通貨に「法外な特権」を付与する。





Moreover, the transition from the dollar regime to its successor could be unstable. "One historical precedent is the coexistence of dollar and sterling during the interwar years," the late Harvard University macroeconomist Emmanuel Farhi told Econ Focus in a 2019 interview. "It's not a particularly happy precedent; it was a period of monetary instability. You saw frequent rebalancing of international portfolios into one reserve currency and out of another, which created a lot of volatility."
History teaches that dominant currencies change infrequently and often over long transition periods. But crises can be the catalyst for those transitions, as was the case when the British pound's centuries-long reign started to unravel after World War I. While almost no economist predicts that the dollar will be replaced soon, market confidence is fickle, and the types of crises that spark a changing of the reserve currency guard are inherently hard to predict.



Indeed, many economists point to a new kind of Triffin dilemma as a greater risk to dollar supremacy than the use of sanctions. Just as the United States faced a crisis of confidence in its ability to back the dollars in circulation during the Bretton Woods era, economists have warned that it could face a similar challenge in the coming years to supply enough safe assets to meet global demand while simultaneously maintaining confidence in its ability to repay its debts. Having more options for safe assets to choose from in the form of different currencies could solve this problem, but not all economists agree that a multipolar system would necessarily be more stable. Competition among countries to grab the reserve currency crown could lead to coordination challenges and questions about which assets are truly safe.

*1:cf. ここ


というリッチモンド連銀のEcon Focus記事をMostly Economicsが紹介している。原題は「Is Dollar Dominance in Doubt?」で、著者は同連銀のTim Sablik。
以下はMostly Economicsからの孫引き。

While there may not be a single obvious replacement for the dollar, that doesn't mean that countries haven't been diversifying into other currencies. The dollar's share of global foreign exchange reserves fell to a 25-year low at the end of 2020, to 59 percent from 71 percent in 1999.
Serkan Arslanalp and Chima Simpson-Bell of the IMF and Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, referred to this development in a recent IMF working paper as "the stealth erosion of dollar dominance." The dollar isn't being replaced on bank balance sheets by another single currency like the euro or renminbi, they found. Rather, most of the shift away from dollars has been into dozens of smaller currencies. They cited a greater desire for portfolio diversification on the part of central banks as well as the falling cost of transacting in smaller currencies as factors that have contributed to this change. This has led some economists to speculate that we could be heading toward a "multipolar" world of many different competing currencies, which could have some advantages.
"Just like biodiversity makes for a more robust global ecology, a multipolar system will be more robust," says Eichengreen. "In addition, an expanding global economy needs additional international liquidity to grease the wheels of globalization, and the U.S. can't provide the requisite safe and liquid assets all by itself."