タイラー・コーエン経由のMIT PhD candidateのジョブマーケット論文をもう一丁*1。以下はEvan Soltas*2が自サイトに掲載している表題の論文（原題は「Tax Incentives and the Supply of Low-Income Housing」）の要旨。
Subsidies to developers are a core instrument of housing policy. How do they affect housing markets, and who benefits? I assess their impacts and incidence with a dynamic model of housing markets and new data on developers competing for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits. I estimate the model using three sources of variation: quasi-random assignment of subsidies, shocks to subsidy generosity, and nonlinearities in scoring rules for subsidy applications. I find that, due to displacement of unsubsidized housing, subsidies add few net units to the housing stock and instead reallocate units progressively. Households benefit from developer competition for subsidies, but competition also results in high entry costs, and developers still capture nearly half of the welfare gains. In counterfactuals, a stylized voucher program can generate the same household benefits at less fiscal cost.
（拙訳）
デベロッパーへの補助金は住宅政策の主要な手段である。それはどのように住宅市場に影響し、誰が得をするのだろうか？ 私は、動学モデルと、低所得者用住宅税額控除*3を求めて競争するデベロッパーの新たなデータを用いて、補助金の影響と誰がどの程度受領するかを見積もった。私は3つの変動の源泉を用いてモデルを推計した。補助金の疑似ランダムな割り当て、補助金の気前の良さへのショック、および補助金申請のスコアリングルールの非線形性である。補助金を受けない住宅が置き換わることにより、補助金による住宅ストックへの戸数の追加は純ベースでは限定的で、むしろ住宅を漸次的に再配分することを私は見い出した*4。補助金を求めるデベロッパーの競争により家計は恩恵を受けるが、競争は高い参入コストにもつながり、しかもデベロッパーは厚生利得の半分近くを獲得する*5。反実仮想においては、定型化されたバウチャー政策によって同等の家計の便益がより少ない財政コストでもたらされる*6。
以下は補助金とバウチャーを比較した図。バウチャーでは賃貸料の市場価格への外部性を相殺するために対象者に所得移転を実施する必要があり、その額は補助金における一戸当たりの賃貸割引の現在価値の倍以上となるが、それでも全体的な財政コストは補助金よりも節約できるとの由。
*1:コーエンは「Recommended!」と推奨している。
*2:この人については「コロナ疾患が労働者に与える影響 - himaginary’s diary」参照。
*4:導入部では「For every ten LIHTC units, I find about eight units displace private housing that would have otherwise been built, and two units are net additions to the housing stock. Applying these displacement estimates to the LIHTC in aggregate, I conclude the LIHTC has expanded the U.S. housing stock by about 500,000 units, or by 0.4 percent. Due to displacement, the fiscal cost of the LIHTC is about $1 million per net new unit on average.」と記述している。
*5:導入部では「 I find households reap about 31 percent of the welfare gains. These gains arise mostly because LIHTC units set rents below market (23 percent of incidence) and in lesser part because the additional housing supply reduces market rents (8 percent of incidence). Yet the household benefits from developer competition are diluted in two ways: Developers capture significant subsidy (44 percent of incidence), and much of the subsidy is competed away by the entry costs that developers pay to apply (25 percent of incidence). In driving profits to zero on the margin, marginal developers pay heavy entry costs but do not eliminate the profits of inframarginal developers with entry-cost advantages.」と記述している。
*6:導入部では「I find vouchers could provide the same welfare benefit to households as the LIHTC at a 25-percent fiscal savings. Conversely, a balanced-budget reform that shifts from developer subsidies to vouchers could expand housing supply and raise household welfare. These findings reflect two considerations. First, these subsidies have opposite-signed pecuniary externalities on the unsubsidized market. To offset effects on unsubsidized households, vouchers require more spending to achieve the same household benefit, all else equal. The second difference between the two policies is that vouchers reduce developer incidence and eliminate entry costs. On net, the balance of these forces favors vouchers, but the disadvantage of the LIHTC is relatively modest.」と記述している。
