というペリー・メーリング(Perry G. Mehrling)のINET記事(原題は「Bernanke v. Kindleberger: Which Credit Channel?」)をMostly Economicsが紹介している(同じ記事をメーリングが自サイトに乗せたものを山形さんもツイッター紹介されている)。

In the 1983 paper cited as the basis for Bernanke’s Nobel award, the first footnote states: “I have received useful comments from too many people to list here by name, but I am grateful to each of them.” One of those unnamed commenters was Charles P. Kindleberger, who taught at MIT full-time until mandatory retirement in 1976 and then half-time for another five years. Bernanke himself earned his MIT Ph.D. in 1979, whereupon he shifted to Stanford as Assistant Professor. Thus it was natural for him to send his paper to Kindleberger for comment, and perhaps also natural for Kindleberger to respond.
As it happens, the carbon copy of that letter has been preserved in the Kindleberger Papers at MIT, and that copy is reproduced below as possibly of contemporary interest. All footnotes are mine, referencing the specific passages of the published paper, a draft copy of which Kindleberger is apparently addressing, and filling in context that would have been familiar to both Bernanke and Kindleberger but may not be to a modern reader. With these explanatory notes, the text speaks for itself and requires no further commentary from me.
“May 1, 1982
Dr. Ben Bernanke
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Dear Dr. Bernanke,
Thank you for sending me your paper on the great depression. You ask for comments, and I assume this is not merely ceremonial. I am afraid you will not in fact welcome them.
I think you have provided a most ingenious solution to a non-problem.[1] The necessity to demonstrate that financial crisis can be deleterious to production arises only in the scholastic precincts of the Chicago school with what Reder called in the last JEL its tight priors, or TP.[2] If one believes in rational expectations, a natural rate of unemployment, efficient markets, exchange rates continuously at purchasing power parities, there is not much that can be explained about business cycles or financial crises. For a Chicagoan, you are courageous to depart from the assumption of complete markets.[3]
You wave away Minsky and me for departing from rational assumptions.[4] Would you not accept that it is possible for each participant in a market to be rational but for the market as a whole to be irrational because of the fallacy of composition? If not, how can you explain chain letters, betting on lotteries, panics in burning theatres, stock market and commodity bubbles as the Hunts in silver, the world in gold, etc… Assume that the bootblack, waiters, office boys etc of 1929 were rational and Paul Warburg who said the market was too high in February 1929 was not entitled to such an opinion. Each person hoping to get in an[d] out in time may be rational, but not all can accomplish it.
Your data are most interesting and useful. It was not Temin who pointed to the spread (your DIF) between governts [sic] and Baa bond yields, but Friedman and Schwartz.[5] Column 4 also interests me for its behavior in 1929. It would be interesting to disaggregate between loans on securities on the one hand and loans and discounts on the other.
Your rejection of money illusion (on the ground of rationality) throws out any role for price changes. I think this is a mistake on account at least of lags and dynamics. No one of the Chicago stripe pays attention to the sharp drop in commodity prices in the last quarter of 1929, caused by the banks, in their concern over loans on securities, to finance commodities sold in New York on consignment (and auto loans).[6] This put the pressure on banks in areas with loans on commodities. The gainers from the price declines were slow in realizing their increases. The banks of the losers failed. Those of the ultimate winners did not expand.
Note, too, the increase in failures, the decrease in credit and the rise in DIF in the last four of five months of 1931.[7] Much of this, after September 21, was the consequence of the appreciation of the dollar from $4.86 to $3.25.[8] Your international section takes no account of this because prices don’t count in your analysis. In The World in Depression, 1929-1939, which you do not list,[9] I make much of this structural deflation, the mirror analogue of structural inflation today from core inflation and the oil shock. But your priors do not permit you to think them of any importance.
Sincerely yours,
[Charles P. Kindleberger]”


拝啓 バーナンキ博士様
貴兄はミンスキーと私を、合理的仮定から離れているとして一蹴しました。市場の各参加者は合理的だが、合成の誤謬により市場全体は非合理的となり得る、ということを貴兄は受け入れないのですか? もしそうならば、チェーンレター、宝くじ賭博、火事になった劇場でのパニック、ハント兄弟が銀*5、世界が金で起こしたような株式市場や商品のバブル、等々を貴兄はどうやって説明できるのですか? 1929年の靴磨き、ウェイター、雑用係らは合理的だと仮定すると、1929年2月に株価が高すぎると言ったポール・ウォーバーグはそうした意見を言う資格が無かったことになります。各人がタイミング良く市場に参加し退出することを望んだのは合理的だったかもしれませんが、全員がそれを達成できるわけではありません。



*3:メーリング注で指摘されているように、バーナンキ論文には「Since the reconciliation of the obvious inefficiency of the depression with the postulate of rational private behavior remains a leading unsolved puzzle of macroeconomics, these two virtues alone provide motivation for serious consideration of this theory.」という一節がある。


*5:cf. シルバーショック - Wikipedia

*6:メーリング注にも記載されているが、1931年9月21日に英国が金本位制を停止した。cf. イギリスの金本位制停止https://www.boj.or.jp/about/outline/history/hyakunen/data/hyaku4_1_5.pdfなど。