The original American populists were reality-based small farmers and others, who accurately saw railroad monopolies, agricultural price deflation, and high interest rates as crippling their ability to lead the good life. They sought policies—sensible, rational policies in the main—to neutralize these three historical forces. They were not Volkisch nativists distracted from a politics that would have made their lives better by the shiny gewgaws of ethnic hatred and nativism The rise of those forces—of Jim Crowe and the renewed and anti-Catholic Ku Klux Klan and so forth—were not the expression of but rather the breaking of populism in America.

The post-WWII Latin American populists were also people who correctly thought that their ability to lead the good life was being sharply hindered by a system rigged against him. The problem with post-WWII Latin American populism was that the policies that it was offered by its political leaders were—while materially beneficial for the base in the short run—economic disasters in the long: price controls, fiscal expansion ending in unsustainable that burdens, and high tariffs were especially poisonous and false remedies because it could look, for the first five or so years, before they crash came, like they were working.


But what is going on today, whatever it is properly called, is not offering sensible policies people oppressed by monopolies and by a creditor friendly and unemployment causing monetary system. It is not even offering them policy cures that are apparently efficacious in the short run even though disastrous in the long. What Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, Viktor Orban, Marine Le Pen, Teresa May, and Donald Trump have to offer is (a) redistribution of wealth to family and friends, (b) a further upward leap in income and wealth inequality via cutbacks in social insurance programs coupled with further erosion of progressive taxation, and, most of all, (c) the permission to hate people who look different from you—plus permission to hate rootless cosmopolites who are, somehow, against all principles of natural justice, both doing better than you and offering you insufficient respect.
That is neither the post-WWII Latin American nor the pre-WWI North American form of "populism". I do not think we are well served by naming it such.
What should we name it instead?
There is an obvious candidate, after all.

  • 家族や友人への富の再分配。
  • 社会保険制度を削減し、累進課税を一層弱めることによって所得と富の格差をさらに大きく拡大すること。


  • 見掛けが違う人を嫌うことを容認すること。加えて、根無し草のコスモポリタンを嫌うことを容認すること。彼らは、何故かあらゆる自然の理に反して、あなた方より上手くやっていると同時にあなた方に然るべき敬意を払っていない、というわけだ。



When Fukuyama wrote his "The End of History?"—note the question mark at the end—his principal aims were twofold:

  1. To advance a Hegelian, or a Kojeveian reinterpretation of Hegelianism, as pointing out that history was ultimately driven by the evolution of ideas of what a good society would be like and consequent attempts to realize them: through Republican, Imperial, Christian, feudal, Renaissance, Enlightenment, rule of law, democratic, socialist, and fascist formulations, the world's conceptions of a good society unfold and develop.
  2. To point out that it now appears—or appeared in 1989—that this Hegelian process of conceptual development had come to an end with the liberal democratic capitalist state and economy: private property rights and market exchange guaranteed by a government controlled by one person-one vote now had no serious challengers, and so this process of historical development—what Fukuyama called History-with-a-capital-H—had come to an end.

Most of Fukuyama's "The End of History" is concerned with the crashing and burning of the idea that the Marxist diagnosis that private property was an inescapably poisoned institution implemented by a Leninist cadre that then set up a Stalinist command economy offered a possible way forward toward a good and free society of associated producers—an alternative to the system that was the reinforcing institutional triad of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. But there was another challenger for much of the twentieth century: fascism. In Fukuyama's words:

[Fascism] saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new 'people' on the basis of national exclusiveness... [an] organized ultra nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions... with regard to the movement's belief in its right to rule other people...


  1. ヘーゲル的、ないしコジェーヴ的なヘーゲル哲学の再解釈を進めて、歴史はつまるところ、良い社会とはどのようなものかという思想と、それを実現しようとする試みによって動いてきた、と指摘すること。共和主義、帝国主義キリスト教主義、封建主義、ルネッサンス啓蒙主義、法至上主義、民主主義、社会主義ファシストの形成を通じて、良い社会についての世界の概念は展開し発展してきた。
  2. このヘーゲル的な概念の発展過程は、自由民主主義的な資本主義国家と経済を以って今や終わりを告げたように思われる――もしくは1989年当時には終わりを告げたように思われた――と指摘すること。一人一票制によってコントロールされた政府の保証する私有財産権と市場取引には、今やまともな挑戦者が見当たらず、従ってこの歴史的発展過程――頭文字が大文字のHistoryフクヤマが呼んだもの――は終わった、というわけだ。




  • 人々にすべきことを指図する強力な指導者と強力な国家
  • その境界内に住むことを選択しそれに忠誠を誓う人々による選ばれた国家ではなく、血と土に基づく民族的な国家
  • 共同体の欠如、無規範状態、弱さに対する非難


  • 物質主義に対する非難
  • 帝国主義的な拡張策への傾倒