引き続き経済学者のインフレに関するツイートねた。今回はリカルド・ライスのツイートを紹介してみる(H/T 本石町日記さんツイート経由のRyo Takagiさんツイート)。

** The “macro” view on 2021 inflation
Since March 21, I've given many public lectures on inflation. All of them included the slide below (most recently at the Jahnsson prize lecture)
Tldr: every macro theory of inflation correctly predicted the high inflation that we have seen
The 1st theory (Phillips, Keynesian) sees inflation as following from the closing of gaps in labor and product markets. Given how quickly the economy was rebounding already at the start of the year (and partly due to fiscal stimulus), inflation was expected to rise in 2021.
The 2nd theory (Wicksellian) sees inflation as resulting from interest rates being too low relative to a “neutral” benchmark. With CBs committing to keep interest rates at minima until 2022 and beyond, most rules (including Taylor's famous one) would put it below that benchmark.
The 3rd theory (monetarist) points to the record-high level of bank deposits that resulted after lockdowns and large fiscal transfers. With the economy reopening, this "money” would chase “goods” raising prices
The 4th theory (fiscalist) looks at fiscal variables. With public debt at record high levels, and the large deficits resulting from the January fiscal plan, the likelihood that fiscal concerns would dominate policy and drive inflation, was surely at a high in 2021.
The 5th theory (commitment) says that ultimately inflation is what the CB chooses it to be, so look at the CB objectives and te stations. The Fed and ECB mission reviews clearly made them become more tolerant of higher inflation relative to other goals.
The 6th theory (new Keynesian) looks at optimal trade-offs between employment and inflation. With supply shocks, the CB will tolerate higher inflation in order to have a speedier recovery.
It is quite rare in economics that every single major theory points in the same direction.
When it happens, we can’t learn which theory is right. But I was unusually confident in saying early in in 2021 that inflation would be high, even before the data was showing it.
Each theory predicts adjustments in different prices moving at different speeds. Each makes a different guess of how high inflation will rise, and which micro features (e.g., slopes of curves, expectations) are central. Data, micro and macro, was very helpful in these two senses
But, in the first half of 2021, if you only looked at micro price "big" data, you would get distracted by: different indices, changing baskets, base effects, measurement errors. You might even (as some did) question if inflation was coming. Theory set you straight.
The macro view of inflation is not *only* about stimulus. @LHSummers focussed on that in his early writings, but the point was broader. When I showed the slide at the diverse audience in the @NBERpubs macro annual in April, some preferred some theories.

Austan Goolsbee
2) Does the strictly macro view of inflation that says it’s mainly about size of stimulus in early 2021 not imply that one year later when that becomes the baseline, the fiscal situation turns highly deflationary?

Note that across theories, both the inflation and its ultimate cause, are not necessarily bad. In some, inflation was a needed sacrifice or even good. But what I've been writing here against is what I've called "team no pasa nada". Hopefully, that is now an untenable stance.
What about inflation beyond 2022? Here theories disagree, data will supports some and reject others, debate is needed, uncertainty is inevitable. As is normally the case.



2) 2021年初めの刺激策の規模が主因だと言う厳密にマクロ的なインフレ見解は、それがベースラインとなる1年後には財政状況が大いにデフレ的になる、ということを含意していないか?

2022年以降のインフレはどうなるだろうか? それについては理論の見解は分かれている。データによってあるものが支持され、あるものは棄却されるだろう。討論が必要であり、不確実性は避けられない。それはいつもと同様だ。