という主旨のProject Syndicate論説をスティーブン・ローチが書いている(H/T Mostlty Economics)。

Through April, Japan’s core CPI was basically flat relative to its year-earlier level, with a similar outcome evident in May for the Tokyo metropolitan area. For the Bank of Japan (BoJ), which committed an unprecedented arsenal of unconventional policy weapons to arrest a 19-year stretch of 16.5% deflation lasting from 1994 to 2013, this is more than just a rude awakening. It is an embarrassment bordering on defeat.
Notwithstanding a modest firming of global economic growth, inflation in the advanced economies is expected to average slightly less than 2% in 2017-2018.
The first chapter of this tale was written many years ago, in Japan. From asset bubbles and excess leverage to currency suppression and productivity impairment, Japan’s experience – with lost decades now stretching to a quarter-century – is testament to all that can go wrong in large and wealthy economies.
But no lesson is more profound than that of a series of policy blunders made by the BoJ. Not only did reckless monetary accommodation set the stage for Japan’s demise; the country’s central bank compounded the problem by taking policy rates to the zero bound (and even lower), embracing quantitative easing, and manipulating long-term interest rates in the hopes of reviving the economy. This has created an unhealthy dependency from which there is no easy exit.
Though Japan’s experience since the early 1990s provides many lessons, the rest of the world has failed miserably at heeding them.


  1. インフレーションと経済のスラックとの間の関係を示すいわゆるフィリップス曲線は、もはや成立していない
    • グローバルサプライチェーンはますます細分化され、世界は供給過剰に陥っている。そうしたサプライチェーンへのアウトソーシングにより、グローバル供給曲線の弾力性は劇的に高まり、労働のスラックや生産市場という概念、およびそうしたスラックがインフレに及ぼす圧力を根本的に変えてしまった。
  2. 今日のグローバリゼーションは本質的に非対称的である
    • 主要経済では需要が深刻なダメージを受けたままである一方、供給は拡大を続けている。その結果として生じる不均衡は本質的にデフレ的である。
  3. 非定常的な流動性の罠とでも呼ぶべき動く標的に対し、中銀はほぼ無力である
    • ケインズ流動性の罠に加え、拡大し続けるグローバル供給曲線があるため、今日の中銀は1930年代よりも無力である。


This is not an incurable disease. In a world of hyper-globalization – barring a protectionist relapse led by the America Firsters – treatment needs to be focused on the demand side of the equation. The most important lesson from the 1930s, as well as from the modern-day Japanese experience, is that monetary policy provides no answer for a chronic deficiency of aggregate demand. Addressing it is a task primarily for fiscal authorities. The idea that central banks should consider making a new promise to raise their inflation targets is hardly credible.
We ignore history at great peril. The latest disappointment for inflation-targeting central banks is really not a surprise after all. The same is true of the related drop in long-term interest rates. There is much to be gained by studying carefully the lessons of Japan.