デロングがアイケングリーンの以下の近著の主張をProject Syndicateで紹介している

Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History

Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History

Equitable Growthブログでは、その元原稿が紹介されている(デロングブログでのエントリ)。以下はそこからの引用。

Hall of Mirrors traces our tepid and inadequate response to the crisis in 2007-2009 to the triumph of monetarism. In the 1960s and 1970s monetarist economists advanced their particular economyc-historical interpretation of the causes of the 1930s Great Depression. And the sometime disciples of Milton Friedman overwhelmed their Keynesian and Minskyite peers.

At one level, the debate between monetarists, Keynesians, and Minskyites was a simple empirical matter of reading the evidence: Was the interest-elasticity of money demand in a serious downturn low, as Milton Friedman claimed, or high, as in John Maynard Keynes’s and John Hicks’s liquidity trap? Were financial markets a near-veil because the money stock was a near-sufficient statistic for predicting total spending, as Milton Friedman claimed, or was the credit channel and its functioning of decisive importance, as Minsky warned?

At the second level, however, the debate was over whether market failure or government failure was the bigger threat. The Great Depression had, before Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History, been seen as an unanswerable argument that market failure was potentially so dire as to require the government to take over direction of the whole economy. And that created a presumption that there might be other, smaller market failure might require a government to be interventionist indeed not just in macro but in micro as well. But if the Great Depression could be understood as a failure of government, then the cognitive dissonance between its reality and right-of-center economists’ presumption that government failure was always the bigger threat could be erased.
ある点において、マネタリストケインズ主義者、ミンスキー主義者の間の議論は、証拠をどう読むかという単純な実証的な問題であった。深刻な不況時の貨幣需要の利子弾力性は、ミルトン・フリードマンが主張するように低かったのか、それともジョン・メイナード・ケインズやジョン・ヒックスの流動性の罠におけるように高かったのか? ミルトン・フリードマンが言うように、貨幣ストックは総支出を予測するに当たってほぼ十分統計量となるので、金融市場はヴェールのようなものなのか、それともミンスキーが警告したように、信用経路とその機能は決定的な重要性を持つのか?

To admit that the monetarist cure was inadequate would be to admit that the Great Depression had deeper roots then a failure of technocratic management on the part of central banks charged with maintaining a neutral monetary policy and a stable money supply growth rate. Such deeper roots in severe market failures would not be consistent with a belief that social democracy had been oversold, and that government failure was almost invariably a worse danger than market failure. There was thus an extremely strong elective affinity between a mainstream economics profession caught up in the gathering neoliberal currents of the age and the Friedmanite interpretation of the Great Depression.

It was the completeness of the victory that made policymakers in 2008-2010 unwilling to apply the Keynesian and Minskyite cures to severe downturns enthusiastically enough and on a large enough scale to adequately deal with the problems that emerged.

And so when 2008 came, the economists advising the North Atlantic’s governments and central banks were not ready.

なお、このデロングの論説に対しては、(予想される通り)サムナーが反発しているほか、David Glasnerも異を唱えている