という小論をクルーグマン書いている(原題は「Globalization: What Did We Miss?」)。以下は抜粋引用。

And the basic fact in the mid 1990s was that imports of manufactured goods from developing countries, while much larger than in the past, were still small relative to the size of advanced economies – around 2 percent of GDP. Given reasonable estimates of factor intensities and elasticities of substitution, this wasn’t enough to cause more than a few percent change in relative wages. This number wasn’t trivial, but it wasn’t big enough to be a central economic story either.
This was a moderately comforting result for free-trade advocates. But what did the 90s consensus miss?
It is, I’d argue, quite possible, even likely, that assessments of the impact of trade made circa 1995, which inevitably relied on data from a couple of years earlier, were right in finding modest effects. In retrospect, however, trade flows in the early 1990s were just the start of something much bigger, what Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler (2013) have dubbed “hyperglobalization.”
...It’s clear that the impact of developing-country exports grew much more between 1995 and 2010 than the 90s consensus imagined possible, which may be one reason concerns about globalization made a comeback.
Does the surge in the trade deficit explain the fall in employment? Yes, to a significant extent. A trade deficit doesn’t produce a one-for-one decline in manufacturing value added, since a significant share of both exports and imports of goods include embodied services. But a reasonable estimate is that the deficit surge reduced the share of manufacturing in GDP by around 1.5 percentage points, or more than 10 percent, which means that it explains more than half of the roughly 20 percent decline in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005.
So does this mean that – not to put too fine a point on it – Trump is right, that a trade war would be in the interest of workers hurt by globalization?
The answer is, as you might guess, no. This answer is based not so much on some rigid commitment to free trade at all costs as on the nature of the losses globalization imposed. Basically, the big problem with surging globalization wasn’t so much changing demand for broadly defined factors of production as the disruption caused by rapid change. And that rapid change appears to be largely behind us: many indicators suggest that hyperglobalization was a one-time event, and that trade has more or less stabilized relative to world GDP. ...
As a result, major disruptions now would be more likely to come from an attempt to reverse globalization than from leaving the current trade regime in place. At this point millions of decisions about where to put plants, where to move and take jobs, have been made on the assumption that the open world trading system will continue.
貿易赤字の拡大は雇用の低下を説明するだろうか? その答えは、イエス、かなりの程度説明する、である。輸出入製品のかなりの部分はサービスが体化したものであるため、貿易赤字は製造業の付加価値を1対1で減らすわけではない。しかし妥当な推計によれば、貿易赤字の拡大は、GDPの製造業比率を約1.5%ポイント、ないし10%以上減らした。これは、1997年から2005年に掛けて製造業の雇用がおよそ20%低下したうちの半分以上を説明することになる。


  1. 1970年代初頭の低賃金競争(当時は日西伊愛が競争相手だった)の方が1990年代半ばよりも激しかった。しかし1970年代初頭から1990年代半ばに掛けてのグローバル化は米国にとって素晴らしいものであり、その間の問題はむしろ共和党の政治や米製造業の失策にあった。
  2. ハイパーグローバリゼーションはブルーカラーの労働者にとって脅威ではなかった。ブルーカラーの中でも知識と経験を持つものはハイパーグローバリゼーションによる業界の発展の恩恵を受け、そうでない者は別の業界に同じくらい良い職を得た。
  3. 2000年代の中国ショックを過大視している。製造業の雇用の減少は技術進歩の影響が大きかったほか、ショックを和らげる共和党の政策が不十分だった。また、中国からの輸入による便益は、中国ショックをかなりの程度相殺した。
  4. 金融危機の影響を綺麗さっぱり無視している。
  5. グローバリゼーションに関する最大の見逃しは、安定した完全雇用の継続が極めて重要である、という点だが、それが抜け落ちている。

*1:cf. これ