In terms of methodology: there was, for a time, some confusion (and a bit of heated debate) over how to use data on trade to assess wage impacts. Most studies focused on the volume of trade, and in particular on the factor content of trade – the labor and other resources embodied in exports, the labor and other resources that would have been required to produce imports. Some economists vehemently objected to this approach, since Stolper-Samuelson is strictly speaking about prices rather than quantities – that is, it’s about the relationship between goods prices and factor prices. Yet goods prices are endogenous; when trying to assess the impact of globalization, it made no sense to treat prices as a causal variable.
What eventually emerged from this debate was a “but-for” approach: asking how different wages would have been but for the rise of manufactured exports from developing countries, which were minimal in 1970 but significant by the mid-1990s. It turned out that this but-for approach was also consistent with a factor content calculation: the effect of North-South manufactures trade on advanced economies was, in simple models, equivalent to what would have happened if the OECD had been a closed economy experiencing immigration of less-educated workers and emigration of more-educated workers corresponding to the factors embodied in the goods being traded.


When trade theorists talk about the distributional effects of trade, they tend to use one of two models (or classes of models.) Heckscher-Ohlin models treat factors of production as fungible across industries, so that possible adverse effects involve broad classes of workers, such as workers without college. Specific-factor models, by contrast, treat factors – definitely capital, but perhaps labor as well -- as being stuck in particular industries.
It’s possible, and probably even correct, to think of specific factors as representing the short run while Heckscher-Ohlin represents the long run. How long is the long run? Good question.
The 90s consensus, however, focused almost entirely on Heckscher-Ohlin-type analysis, asking how the growth of trade had affected the incomes of broad labor classes, as opposed to workers in particular industries and communities. This was, I now believe, a major mistake – one in which I shared.
The thing is, anyone who worked on the political economy of trade policy knew that fights over tariffs look very much as if they come out of a specific-factors world: labor and capital within a given industry are generally on the same side in trade policy disputes, not on opposite sides as they would be if they were thinking about the broad factoral distribution of income. It should have been obvious that the general politics of globalization would reflect that same reality.
That is, never mind the question of how trade affects the blue-collar/white-collar wage gap, or the aggregate Gini coefficient; the politics of globalization were likely to be much more influenced by the experience of individual sectors that gained or lost from shifting trade flows.
特定要素モデルが短期を表し、ヘクシャー=オリーンモデルが長期を表している、と考えることは可能であり、おそらく正しくさえあるだろう。この長期とはどのくらいの長さだろうか? よい質問だ。



One major contrast between most economic analyses of globalization’s impact and those of the broader public – including, of course, Donald Trump – is focus, or lack thereof, on trade imbalances. The public tends to see trade surpluses or deficits as determining winners and losers; the general-equilibrium trade models that underlay the 90s consensus gave no role to trade imbalances at all.
The economists’ approach is almost certainly right for the long run, both because countries must pay their way eventually and because trade imbalances mainly affect the relative shares of traded and nontraded sectors in employment, with no clear effect on the overall demand for labor. However, in the long run we are all dead, and rapid changes in trade balances can cause serious problems of adjustment...


*1:cf. ここ