After seven years of economic over-optimism there is a growing awareness that challenges are not so much a legacy of the financial crisis as of deep structural changes in the global economy. There is increasing reason to doubt that the industrial world is capable of simultaneously enjoying reasonable interest rates that support savers, financial stability and the current financial system and adequate economic growth at the same time. Saving has become overabundant, new investment insufficient and stagnation secular rather than transient.
It can hardly come as a great surprise that when economic growth falls short year after year and when its beneficiaries are a small subset of the population, electorates turn surly. They lose confidence in traditional policy approaches and their advocates.
Looking back at the political traumas of 1968 when there were people in the streets in many countries, it is clear that there was something going on beyond specific issues like Vietnam in the US.
In the same way as with Brexit, the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, the strength of rightwing nationalists in many European countries, Vladimir Putin’s strength in Russia and the return of Mao worship in China, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the world is seeing a renaissance of populist authoritarianism.
These developments are mutually reinforcing. Weak economics promotes angry politics which raises uncertainty leading to even weaker economics. And so the cycle starts again. People have lost confidence both in the competence of economic leaders and in their commitment to serving the wider public rather than the global elite.


  • 緊縮経済を棄却し、投資経済を目指す
    • 市場は過剰なインフレよりも次世代の問題を懸念しているのだから、中銀は需要を喚起し、政府と協調するべき
    • 財政政策は官民におけるインフラ投資の拡大を優先課題とすべき
  • 国際的な経済政策の協調においては、資本の収益機会よりも、労働にとってより良い結果をもたらすことに重点を移すべき
    • そのために、資本移動の自由の負の側面であるマネーロンダリングや規制の裁定や租税回避・脱税に対する国際的な対策を強化すべき