前回紹介したDemocracy Now!のスティグリッツインタビューは、日本語サイトでも紹介されているように、TPP批判もさることながら、BRICS銀行へのスティグリッツの称賛が一つの大きな特色になっている。司会のエイミー・グッドマンは、スティグリッツを「新銀行の後見人(the godfather of this new bank)」とまで呼んでいる。

The reason I was so enthusiastic is that the needs for funds for development, for infrastructure, are so huge, and the existing institutions can just supply a small percentage. And our global private financial markets just aren’t working. I mean, let me give you an example. Before the 2008 crisis, Ben Bernanke said that there was a savings glut: We had too much savings. You know, he must have been living on a different planet than I was living, because when I traveled around Africa, other development countries, I didn’t see a problem of too much savings. I saw enough—a problem of huge investment needs. And the problem was that existing financial institutions weren’t taking the savings and putting to where it was needed. It was clear that the private institutions couldn’t do this. You know, they knew how to engage in predatory lending and taking advantage of poor people. They were good at that. But they weren’t good of taking the surplus of savings and putting them to the place where there are huge social needs.
It’s not part of their business model. You know, they make money from speculation, from trading, from derivatives, from market manipulation—you know, the gamut of everything except looking around for what are the most socially productive uses of investment and how to manage the risk associated with those investments. So, that’s why you need a development bank.


It’s going to be headed by an Indian. It will be located in Shanghai. It has a governing structure that will involve all of the BRICS countries, and unlike, say, the IMF, where the U.S. is the single country with a veto power, it’s going to—all of them will have equal votes.
One aspect of it is it will employ all the new learning that we have about new instruments, new governance. So, for instance, it has the facility, the ability to, say, create a fund that can bring in not only countries, but, say, sovereign wealth funds, to use not just debt, but equity, or to use more, you know, the advances in modern financial technique, financial risk management. So, I think it’s going to try to be a 21st century institution. The other institutions have been trying to adapt from the 20th century—1944 was when they were founded—but, you know, it’s difficult to move these big institutions, particularly difficult to change governance.
The United States doesn’t like the fact that as of some time in September, the United States will be the second-largest country in the world, according to the new way we measure purchasing power parity, how we compare countries. Well, I think it’s difficult for the United States to accept the notion it’s no longer the—will no longer be the largest country. It’s no longer the largest country in trade, in savings, in other areas, but this will be the second-largest country in the world.
Behind China. But the global governance does not reflect these new economic realities. And this new institution is not going to change everything, I mean, clearly. It’s just a little bit of movement, but it’s a movement in the right direction, reflecting the new economic and political realities and reflecting the learning that we’ve done in the last 70 years.


...it reflects a fundamental change in global economic and political power, that one of the ideas behind this is that the BRICS countries today are richer than the advanced countries were when the World Bank and the IMF were founded. We’re in a different world. At the same time, the world hasn’t kept up. The old institutions have not kept up. You know, the G-20 talked about and agreed on a change in the governance of the IMF and the World Bank, which were set back in 1944—there have been some revisions—but the U.S. Congress refuses to follow along with the agreement. The administration failed to go along with what was widely understood as the basic notion that, you know, in the 21st century the heads of these institutions should be chosen on the basis of merit, not just because you’re an American. And yet, the U.S. effectively reneged on that agreement. So, this new institution reflects the disparity and the democratic deficiency in the global governance and is trying to restart, to rethink that.


I think the sanctions probably motivated Russia to be even more enthusiastic about this, because it gave it a political context in which it wasn’t the outsider but was one of the team of creating a new global architecture.