“They were running the biggest start-up in the world, and they didn’t have anyone who had run a start-up, or even run a business,” said David Cutler, a Harvard professor and health adviser to Obama’s 2008 campaign, who was not the individual who provided the memo to The Washington Post but confirmed he was the author. “It’s very hard to think of a situation where the people best at getting legislation passed are best at implementing it. They are a different set of skills.”

The White House’s leadership of the immense project — building new health insurance marketplaces for an estimated 24 million Americans without coverage — is one of several key reasons that the president’s signature domestic policy achievement has become a self-inflicted injury for the administration.


All in all, the administration has immense decisions to make about transforming health care delivery and coverage. But no one I interact with has confidence that your current personnel and configuration is up to the task.


ただ、それだけならばクリングが指摘したようなスーツとギークの分断で話は終わるが、実際には共和党側の執拗な攻撃への恐怖が少なからず開発を歪めたことも記事では指摘している*1。実際、記事のタイトルは「いかに政治的な怖れが技術的な必要性に対置されたか(How political fear was pitted against technical needs)」となっており、また、上で引用した政権の自損事故という指摘の直後には以下の記述がある。

Based on interviews with more than two dozen current and former administration officials and outsiders who worked alongside them, the project was hampered by the White House’s political sensitivity to Republican hatred of the law — sensitivity so intense that the president’s aides ordered that some work be slowed down or remain secret for fear of feeding the opposition.


From the beginning, the administration worked in a venomous political climate. “You’re basically trying to build a complicated building in a war zone, because the Republicans are lobbing bombs at us,” the White House official said.
White House officials contend that the political sensitivities did not influence the substance or pace of the work. But others who were involved say otherwise.