2005年のFOMC議事録が先週末に公開されたが*1、Calculated Riskがピックアップした6月の議事録が話題を集めている。その会合では住宅バブルに焦点が当てられており、Calculated Riskではその中から当時のジャック・グイン・アトランタ連銀総裁の報告の以下の部分を引用している（強調はCalculated Risk）。
[T]there is the housing situation, which we talked about for a long time yesterday afternoon. As I’ve been reporting for several meetings, some of our markets, especially those in coastal areas of South Florida and the Florida panhandle, are experiencing a level of building activity and price increases that are clearly, in my view, unsustainable. Nearly every major Florida city now has experienced increases in the double-digit range, and some, like Miami, Palm Beach, Sarasota, and West Palm, have been reporting increases in housing prices on a year-over-year basis of between 25 and 30 percent. While our discussion yesterday did not seem to indicate a consensus on a national housing bubble, based on past experience I’m reasonably comfortable characterizing the housing feeding frenzy in some of our markets as being a bubble or a near bubble.
For example, the number of major projects planned or under construction in Miami now totals 114, most of which are high-rise developments. That includes 61,000 condo units—eight times the number that were built in the last decade—and a total of 100,000 new parking spaces. I know we don’t have any process for introducing exhibits into the record, but I’d like to pass Dave Stockton this pictorial of the new projects in Miami, so that he can continue to worry a little bit along with me. [Laughter]
My supervision and regulation staff thinks this is an accident waiting to happen in our area. And while the local market excesses probably do not represent systemic national risk, the shakeouts could have serious regional consequences. My bank supervision staff points out that housing-related credit risks to our bank lenders are not so much from defaults on permanent mortgage financing that we talked about yesterday, but rather from lending for land acquisition, development, and construction. The ugly picture we have seen before—and that they think we may very likely see again before long—goes something like this: the drying up of sales of new units; the painful decision of developers to go ahead and complete the construction of additional units to make them saleable, further depressing the market; and speculators who had hoped to see big capital gains walking away or defaulting on their contracts, giving their properties back to the lender. Perhaps it’s because of where I sit, but I am less comforted than some of my colleagues about the housing situation. ...
なお、邦訳については、金融市場Watch Weblogさんがこの引用部分を全訳されているので、そちらを参照されたい。
Calculated Riskでは、この直後にグリーンスパンの「コーヒー休憩を入れましょう（Let’s take a break for coffee）」という言葉が引用されているので、恰もグイン総裁が表明した懸念をグリーンスパンが柳に風と受け流して休憩に入ったかのような印象を与える。それを受けたSalonのAndrew Leonardは、「Most economically damaging coffee break of all time? Perhaps, ... （史上最も高くついたコーヒーブレイク？ たぶんそうだ、…」と揶揄している。
しかし元の議事録を読むと、上記の引用部の後にグイン総裁は一通りのマクロ経済概観を述べ、最後に
I’ve already expressed my concerns about the unstable path of housing in at least some important local markets. I believe that the least risky policy strategy through these unusual times is to set monetary policy so that it does not contribute to unsustainable activities. Therefore, I believe that continuing on our recent policy path for the next few meetings would be the best course of action. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
（拙訳）
少なくともいくつかの重要な地域で見られる住宅市場の不安定な動向に関する私の懸念については既に表明しました。こうした尋常ならざる時期において最もリスクの低い政策戦略は、持続不可能な活動に一役買うようなことのない形で金融政策を策定することだと私は思います。従って、最近の政策の方針をあと数回の会合において継続することが最善の行動計画になるかと存じます。議長、ありがとうございました。
と発言を締め括っている。その後にグリーンスパンのコーヒー休憩発言が出ているので、Calculated Riskの引用のやり方はやや印象操作的な気もする。
ちなみにこの会合では25ベーシスポイントの政策金利引き上げが全員一致で決定され*2、グイン総裁の支持する方針通り、前年半ば以降の25ベーシスポイントずつの引き上げを継続している（そしてその方針は、翌年半ばまで継続されることになる）。
